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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
tionalized the child from birth and visit the child for several
hours on the average of once every two months, it is hard to
justify allowing the parents to retain the same dominant
power over health care decisions as they would if the child
were living at home. Such parents are not in as good a posi-
tion to judge the best interests of the child as those who have
become the "psychological parents" 58 making the day-to-day
custodial decisions for the child. The parents should make
medical decisions when they are qualified to do so. However,
as the United States Supreme Court indicates, when their
commitment to the child has been less than that of the day-
to-day parent, a lesser emphasis should be placed on their
decisions.59
WILLIAM A. MOELLER
TRADEMARKS - Trademarks and Tradenames -
Actions for Infringement of Technical Marks
Equated with Those for Infringement of Nontechni-
cal Marks Which Have Acquired a Secondary Mean-
ing. First Wisconsin National Bank of Milwaukee v.
Wichman, 85 Wis. 2d 54, 270 N.W.2d 168 (1978). In
the recent case of First National Bank of Milwaukee v. Wich-
man,1 the Wisconsin Supreme Court abolished the traditional
common-law distinctions between actions brought for in-
fringement of technical trademarks2 and those commenced to
protect nontechnical trademarks' which had acquired a secon-
dary meaning.4 By its decision, the court expanded the scope
of protection available to nontechnical marks with secondary
meaning and eliminated the necessity of a plaintiff's proving
58. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 17-21 (1973).
59. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
1. 85 Wis. 2d 54, 270 N.W.2d 168 (1978).
2. 3 R. CALLMAN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES(3d ed. 1969), § 66.1, at 21-22 [hereinafter cited as 3 R. CALLMAN].
3. Id.
4. 25 Mo. L. REV. 100, 101 (1960).
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direct competition with,5 and the fraudulent intent of" the de-
fendant in an action to protect a nontechnical mark. The
Wichman holding appears to indicate that the proper focus of
analysis in trademark infringement cases is upon the nature of
the defendant's conduct and its effect on the plaintiff rather
than upon the nature or character of the mark involved. The
court's apparent recognition of the artificiality of distinctions
previously drawn between technical marks and nontechnical
marks which have acquired a secondary meaning is defensible
both in theory and when considering the realities of the
marketplace.
I. THE CASE
The First Wisconsin National Bank of Milwaukee adopted
its name in 1919. The bank first registered its tradename,
"First Wisconsin," with the Wisconsin Secretary of State in
1967 with the registration restricted to banking. The First
Wisconsin Bankshares Corporation is a bank holding com-
pany which registered the name "First Wisconsin" with the
United States Patent Office in 1969, such registration being
limited to use in connection with "general banking services."
Beginning in 1967, the bank and the bank holding company
emphasized this tradename in their advertising and promo-
tions, and since 1966 they spent more than one million dollars
per year advertising the name.7
In 1970, Gerald E. Wichman began doing business as a
builder and seller of horiies in the Milwaukee area under the
name of "First Wisconsin Home Company." Wichman regis-
tered the name of his company with the Wisconsin Secretary
of State in 1970 as a tradename limited to the business of
building and selling homes. Wichman built over 100 homes
between 1970 and 1975 and established a good reputation for
honesty and fine workmanship.8
In 1973, the plaintiffs, First Wisconsin National Bank of
Milwaukee and First Wisconsin Bankshares Corporation,
brought an action to enjoin Wichman's use of the name "First
5. 85 Wis. 2d at 66.
6. Id. at 64-65.
7. Id. at 58-59.
8. Id. at 57.
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Wisconsin." The action, rather than being based upon the
filings the bank and holding company had made with the Sec-
retary of State and the patent offices, was founded upon the
common-law torts of infringement and unfair competition.9
The trial court held that Wichman had infringed upon the
plaintiffs' tradename and granted the injunction.
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's finding that the defendant's use of the name "First
Wisconsin Home Company" had infringed upon plaintiff's
nontechnical mark, "First Wisconsin," which, it was admitted
by defendant Wichman, had acquired a secondary meaning.10
Further, the court held that a showing of fraudulent intent on
the part of the defendant, previously an element of an action
to protect a nontechnical mark which had acquired secondary
meaning, was no longer required. 1 Instead, the court ap-
peared to hold that fraudulent intent merely constituted a
factor to be considered in determining the likelihood of confu-
sion between the marks. Finally, the court noted that there
was no necessity of showing direct competition between the
plaintiff and defendant in order to maintain an action for in-
fringement, so long as there existed a likelihood of confusion
of business - that is, confusion as to the sponsorship or ori-
gin of goods or services.' 2
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A technical mark, known as a trademark at common law, is
a name, sign, or mark which one adopts to denominate com-
mercial goods originating from a particular source. 3 Its pri-
mary purposes are to identify the source of goods or services
and to distinguish them from other goods or services. 4 To
constitute a technical mark, the word, name, symbol, or device
used to identify the goods or services and distinguish them
9. Id. at 56.
10. Id. at 64.
11. Id. at 65.
12. Id. at 67.
13. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Independent Directory Services,
Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 907 (W.D. Ark. 1974).
14. Developments in the Law - Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 68 HAiv. L.
REV. 814, 822 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; see also Handler & Pickett,
Trade-marks and Trade Names - An Analysis and Synthesis, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
168 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Handler & Pickett].
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from the goods and services of others must reflect a certain
originality. A technical mark is one which is fanciful, arbi-
trary, unique, distinctive, or nondescriptive. 15 Upon first use16
of a technical mark, trademark rights accrue." When the
mark qualifies as a technical trademark it is said that the
mark has been exclusively "appropriated" by its owner,"s and
the owner acquires a "monopoly" over the mark.19 A mark
may be appropriated to the use of one person.2 0
Nontechnical marks, "tradenames" in the old common-law
nomenclature, are trade designations which fail to qualify
under the standards for technical marks.2' For example, words
descriptive of qualities of attributes of the product, personal
names, geographical terms, and the like are designated as
nontechnical marks.22 Such a mark is protected only after it
has acquired "secondary meaning"" since it is not immedi-
ately distinctive as applied to the goods. Secondary meaning
arises when the mark has been used in such a manner that, to
the public mind, it is so associated with the goods that it
serves to identify the goods and distinguish them from the
goods of others.2 ' In other words, when the symbol acquires
source significance among consumers, it achieves a legally pro-
15. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 66.1, at 22.
16. Lane, A Primer for the General Practitioner on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, 34 Mo. B. J. 86, 87 (1978); Developments, supra note 14, at 819.
A trade-mark at common law is acquired not solely through origination of
the mark but through its use in trade. No specific period of use is generally
required; a single instance may be sufficient, if the circumstances show intent
to continue. This use must generally be more than a shipment within the same
business organization. There must be a bona-fide use in trade...
Id.
17. Treece, Developments in the Law of Trademarks and Service Marks - Con-
tributions of the Common Law, the Federal Act, State Statutes and the Restate-
ment of Torts, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 890-91 (1970).
18. American Plan Corp. v. Tate Loan and Fin. Corp., 365 F.2d 635, 637 (3rd Cir.
1966).
19. Developments, supra note 14, at 824.
20. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 66.1, at 21.
21. Id. at 21, 22.
22. Beavers & Laney, Choosing and Protecting the Corporate Name, 30 OKLA. L.
REV. 507, 514 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Beavers & Laney]; Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. Nationwide Independent Directory Services, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Ark.
1974).
23. Beavers & Laney, supra note 22, at 514.
24. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Independent Directory Services,
Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 907 (W.D. Ark. 1974); 25 Mo. L. REV. 100, 101 (1960).
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tectable status. Therefore, a nontechnical trademark which
acquires a secondary meaning essentially serves the same
function as a technical trademark, namely, source
identification.
At common law, the form and scope of relief available
upon infringement of a trademark was very different than
that granted for unfair use of a tradename which had acquired
a secondary meaning.25 A trademark, which was required to be
affixed to the merchandise it was intended to identify, was
protected by an action for infringement.2 ' A tradename, after
having acquired a secondary meaning, could be protected by
an action to restrain "passing off" or unfair competition.27
One commentator has described the differences between the
two forms of relief in the following manner:
A trademark will be protected even against innocent in-
fringement; a tradename only against fraudulent simulation.
If a trademark is substantially copied, its use will be en-
joined notwithstanding that it is accompanied by such dis-
tinguishing features as render it unlikely that the public will
mistake the goods bearing the simulated mark for those
stamped with the original. If a tradename is imitated, relief
will be granted only if such confusion of the public is proba-
ble. The injunction against the imitation of a trademark is
absolute, all use of the mark being prohibited; the injunction
restraining simulation of a tradename is qualifed or limited
in scope preventing only those uses of the mark which
render it likely that the public will confuse the products
bearing the marks.28
25. Generally, the remedies available to a plaintiff in an action to protect a mark,
technical or nontechnical, include injunctions, damages, profits and attorneys' fees.
Of these, injunctive relief is the most important. See B. PATTISHALL & D. HILLARD,
TRADE-MARKS, TRADE IDENTITY AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES § 10-1 (1974); Develop-
ments, supra note 14.
26. Trademarks may be classified as either "strong" or "weak." A strong mark is
one which is fanciful or arbitrary. The strong mark is given protection against imita-
tion on a wide variety of goods and services. A weak mark is one which is suggestive
of the qualities of the product, generally laudatory or simply common in use. A weak
mark is generally accorded less protection than a strong one. This particular system
of classification of marks actually goes to the question of the likelihood of confusion
of the marks and is merely one factor to consider when determining whether or not a
mark has been infringed upon. See Developments, supra note 14, at 847-48.
27. Handler & Pickett, supra note 14, at 168-69.
28. Id.
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Thus, although trademarks and tradenames which acquired a
secondary meaning basically served the same purpose, the
scope of protection and form of relief accorded each at com-
mon law were quite different.29
29. An infringement action protecting a mark which serves the function of source
identification should be distinguished from an action brought to prevent the "dilu-
tion" of the same mark. The infringement action is brought to prevent confusion as
to the source of the goods or services to which the mark relates. Hence, in the in-
fringement action the gravamen of the claim is whether the defendant's use of his
symbol will create a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods or services.
In contrast, the action for dilution seeks to protect the distinctive quality of a
mark. This is to say that the action for dilution seeks to preserve the uniqueness or
individuality of the mark and thereby prevent the gradual whittling away or disper-
sion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark.
Protection from dilution is a recent development in American trade identity law.
It is ordinarily a statutorily created right. Generally, antidilution statutes require a
plaintiff to prove that a distinctive quality has attached to the mark and that the
defendant's use of his own mark is likely to dilute or diminish the distinctiveness of
plaintiff's mark.
Distinctiveness may stem from the mark's uniqueness, or from its long use. It may
stem from the superior quality of the goods or services with which it is associated. Or,
the quality or extensiveness of the advertising promoting the mark may lend it
distinctiveness.
Once the plaintiff proves that his mark is distinctive and that the defendant's
conduct is or is likely to dilute this distinctiveness, courts are generally empowered to
enjoin the defendant's conduct. The injunction to be issued is generally limited in
scope by statute to use by another of the same or any similar mark which creates a
likelihood of injury to the distinctive quality of the mark.
As an example of the use and operation of antidilution statutes, see Polaroid
Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963), perhaps the classic antidilution
case. There, the court, using the Illinois antidilution statute, enjoined the use of "Po-
laroid," as in connection with the design and installation of heating and refrigeration
systems, as a dilution of plaintiff's mark "Polaroid," as used primarily on a variety of
consumer goods.
Thus, it should be clear that actions for infringement and dilution are complimen-
tary. They protect different interests. An action for infringement protects against
confusion as to source. In contrast, an action for dilution protects against erosion of
the distinctive qualities of a mark; it is not dependent upon a showing of a likelihood
of confusion as to source. Nevertheless, many courts have held that an action for
dilution is dependent upon a showing of a likelihood of confusion as to source.
Having said all this, it should be noted that Wisconsin has not recognized a right
of action based upon the concept of dilution either as a matter of common law or by
statute. See generally B. PATTISHALL & D. HILLARD, TRADEMARKS, TRADE IDENTITY
AND UNFAIR TRADE PRAcTIcEs, ch.5 (1974); Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for
Trademark - Trade Identity Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 67 T.M. Rep.
607 (1977); Developments, supra note 14, at 851-52.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Unfair Competition and Infringement
As noted in the preceding discussion, technical trademarks
were generally protected in an action for trademark infringe-
ment, while nontechnical trademarks or tradenames were pro-
tected in an action for unfair competition. If it is granted that
a technical mark and a nontechnical mark which have ac-
quired a secondary meaning serve the same function, the
question arises as to whether the extent and mode of protec-
tion ought to differ.
The historical basis for the distinction in actions proceeds
from the nature of the symbols to be protected. That is, the
justification for the difference stems not from a focus upon
the function of the symbol, but rather from a focus on the
nature of the marks themselves. Since a technical mark must
be fanciful or arbitrary, courts have held that no one is in-
jured by allowing their owners a monopoly on the symbol.30
On the other hand, when a symbol can be characterized as a
nontechnical mark, it has been held to be the common prop-
erty of mankind. 1 A grant of monopoly over such a symbol
could injure a competitor who has a commercially necessary
reason for using the language constituting the mark to de-
scribe his product.2 The presence of secondary meaning justi-
fied the law in protecting a mark not otherwise eligible for
protection, but limited the protection at common law to either
denominative3 3 uses by competitors, 4 or descriptive uses of
the symbol when it was so used as to lead the public to believe
that it was purchasing the goods of the original user.3 5
The logic of the foregoing rationale is perhaps appealing
on its surface, but is subject to criticism from two perspec-
tives. First, the traditional rationale outlined above focused
upon the assertion that a monopoly is granted to the holder of
30. Handler & Pickett, supra note 14, at 170.
31. Id. at 169.
32. Developments, supra note 14, at 824.
33. A denominative use is a use which designates a definite "species" of product.
Perhaps the classic example of a unique symbol denominating a product is the trade-
mark "Kodak" for a type (species) of camera. See Handler & Pickett, supra note 14,
at 170.
34. 25 Mo. L. REV. 100, 101 (1960).
35. Id.
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a technical mark. However, "no monoploy is ever obtained in
any mark."38 Even in cases of fanciful or arbitrary marks,
noncommercial 7 and descriptive uses of technical marks are
allowed." Furthermore, the extent of protection accorded a
technical mark is rather narrowly defined in cases where the
mark is similar to a general term necessary for another's use.3 9
The extent of the first user's right to a mark seemingly is de-
fined by the other's necessity.40 Moreover, the "monopoly"
granted to the first user of a technical mark is limited to the
geographical area within which the goods or services are mar-
keted.4 1 Therefore, the monopoly by argument is seriously
undermined.
The second criticism which may be levied against the
traditional rationale focuses upon the kind of protection and
the scope of relief afforded a nontechnical mark which has ac-
quired secondary meaning. Should there, as a practical mat-
ter, be any difference recognized between the two types of
marks? With respect to the kind of protection available, it is
helpful to recall that where secondary meaning has attached
to a nontechnical mark, a second user's right to use the mark
both adjectivally and substantively is qualified by the first
user's right not to have another's goods sold as his own. 4 2 It
36. Handler & Pickett, supra note 14, at 200.
37. A noncommercial use would, for example, be a use of the mark in a work of
fiction. Handler and Pickett recognize that there is no authority on this point but
feel, quite correctly, that there is no serious argument for extending protection of a
mark so far. See Handler & Pickett, supra note 14.
38. Id.
Probably the best example of a commercially valid use of another's technical
trademark is found in the "repair parts" cases. A manufacturer of repair or
replacement parts for trademarked articles may make collateral reference to
the mark in advertisements and upon the parts themselves so long as he does
not create the impression that they were manufactured by the original manu-
facturer or that he is authorized by such manufacturer to make them.
Id. at 174.
39. See, e.g., Clotworthy v. Schepp, 42 F. 62 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890) where use of the
word "pudding" for uncooked pudding was allowed notwithstanding the previous
adoption of "puddine." This discussion is continued in Handler & Pickett, supra note
14, at 178-79.
40. Handler & Pickett, supra note 14, at 179.
41. At common law, the rights in a technical trademark extended only to the spe-
cific trading areas of use where there were conflicting claims to the same mark. E.
KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER, at 244 (1975).
42. Handler & Pickett, supra note 14, at 181.
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would seem that as a matter of fairness, the second user's use
of the words constituting the first user's mark should be privi-
leged when used in their ordinary or dictionary sense but not
when used in their denominative sense; that is, in the special
sense created by the first user.43 The measure of the first
user's rights and the second user's privilege should be the
commercial necessity of the second user's employing the
mark.," Thus, the test to determine the kind and extent of
protection available to a nontechnical mark with secondary
meaning should be identical to that available to a technical
mark.
With respect to the scope of relief granted to holders of
each type of mark, two important commentators in this area,
Handler and Pickett, in their exhaustive work published in
1930, cited cases showing that both descriptive and denomina-
tive use of a nontechnical mark which had acquired secondary
meaning could be made by a second user so long as care was
taken to distinguish his goods from those of the first user.45
They concluded, however, that courts, in fashioning relief in
cases involving a mark based upon descriptive terms of slight
commercial significance, ' and geographical names, 7 relied
upon the test advocated above.'8
Assessing the merits of the monopoly argument, Handler
and Pickett concluded that "the question of monopoly is com-
pletely beside the point.' 49 "Eliminating all false comparisons,
the trademark and the tradename (non-technical mark) cases
seem to present results which are profoundly alike. The scope
of relief depends in both cases upon the defendant's necessity
and not upon the etymological character of the plaintiff's
mark."50
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has joined a growing num-
ber of jurisdictions51 in discarding previous distinctions be-
43. Id. at 183.
44. Id. at 184.
45. Id. at 181.
46. Id. at 188.
47. Id. at 194-95.
48. Under the test referred to, the extent of a first user's rights in a mark is de-
fined by the commercial necessity of the use of that mark by another.
49. Handler & Pickett, supra note 14, at 191.
50. Id.
51. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 66.1 at 23; American Plan Corp. v. Tate Loan &
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tween the two actions, requiring only that secondary meaning
attach to the nontechnical mark to afford it the same protec-
tion as a technical mark. In so holding, the court has chosen
to equate symbols which serve the same purpose and which
perform the same functions. Such a position appears reasona-
ble on both a theoretical and practical basis.
B. Fraudulent Intent
Relying on Vredenburg v. Safety Devices Corp.,52 defen-
dant Wichman argued that the plaintiff failed to prove fraud-
ulent intent on the defendant's part to prey on the source
connotation of plaintiff's mark. In Vredenburg, the court
stated, "where no exclusive right to the use of a trade-mark
exists, fraud-unfair competition-in the use of the mark by
another must be proved. . . . ",5 The difficulty with the de-
fendant's reliance on this statement is that is was clearly
dicta. The question before the court was the propriety of a
trial court's grant of an injunction restraining the defendant's
use of plaintiff's nontechnical mark, "handi-horse," for an ad-
justable saw horse where the plaintiff brought an action for
trademark infringement. The court held that an injuction was
not proper." Therefore, the characterization of fraudulent in-
tent as a requirement for a claim for unfair competition in
Wisconsin was correctly held to be dicta.
Thus, the question of the necessity of proving fraudulent
intent to establish a claim of unfair competition to protect a
nontechnical mark which had acquired a secondary meaning
remained open. As noted earlier, a technical mark tradition-
ally has been protected even against innocent infringement. 5
A nontechnical mark, on the other hand, was historically pro-
tected only against fraudulent simulation. 6 Evidence of
Fin. Corp., 365 F.2d 635, 637 (3rd Cir. 1966); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nation-
wide Independent Directory Services, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 900, 907 (W.D. Ark. 1974);
Fuqua v. Roberts, 269 Ala. 59, 110 So. 2d 886 (1949); Eastern Columbia v. Waldman,
30 Cal. 2d 864, 181 P.2d 865 (1947); Coca-Cola v. Nehi Corp., 26 Del. Ch. 140 -, 25
A.2d 364, 369 (1942); Koolvent Metal Awning Corp. of Am. v. Price, 368 Pa. 528, 84
A.2d 296 (1951).
52. 270 Wis. 36, 70 N.W.2d 226 (1955).
53. Id. at 42, 70 N.W.2d at 230.
54. Id.
55. E. KINTER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER, at 268 (1975).
56. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 86.1(a), at 1052-53.
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fraudulent intent in infringement cases 57 is an important fac-
tor to be considered in establishing the "likelihood of confu-
sion" between the marks. 8
As the law of trademarks developed, however, this distinc-
tion between technical and nontechnical marks which had de-
veloped a secondary meaning became unimportant. The re-
quirement of proof of "fraud" has been relaxed to the extent
that little attention has been paid to the defendant's motives
or state of mind.59 Handler and Pickett concluded that fraud
"[is] merely a conscious use of a confusingly similar mark; and
the difference between the two actions centers about the ele-
ment of notice or knowledge." 0 Even in early decisions the
only instance in which an action for infringement would lie
when an action for unfair competition would not was where a
defendant began using a mark without knowledge of the
plaintiff's prior use and discontinued his use upon acquiring
such knowledge. In such a case, the element of fraudulent in-
tent could not be shown to exist. This particular set of cir-
cumstances, however, rarely occurred. 1 In practice, therefore,
the distinction between actions for infringement and unfair
competition with respect to the element of fraudulent intent
has largely become nonexistent.
Consonant with this reality, the modern trend appears to
be that it is no longer essential to show fraudulent intent in
cases involving protection of nontechnical marks.6 2 Further-
more, to circumvent the requirement of showing fraudulent
intent, courts have simply created fictions such as construc-
tive fraud, presumption of fraud from passing off, definition of
fraud as a deceit foisted upon the public, or by a presumption
that one intends the natural consequences of his act, to lessen
57. "Generally one infringes another's mark if he uses it or something confusingly
like it to denominate his own goods and purchasers are likely to believe that the
goods are those of the trademarked producer." Livermore, On Uses of a Competitor's
Trademark, 20 STAN. L. REV. 448, 451 (1976).
58. E. KINTER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER, at 226 (1975);
Koolvent Metal Awning Corp. of Am. Price, 368 Pa. 528, 84 A.2d 296 (1951).
59. Handler & Pickett, supra note 14, at 769.
60. Id. at 770.
61. Id. at 775.
62. Beavers & Laney, supra note 22, at 534; E. KINTER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER, at 274 (1975).
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the burden of actually proving fraudulent intent.6 Thus,
there is a solid practical basis for the elimination of the re-
quirement of .proof of fraudulent intent in cases of this na-
ture,64 as well as a strong theoretical basis for its elimination.
The traditional argument for the requirement was that while
the owner of a technical mark had an absolute right to use his
mark,65 the nontechnical mark owner was protected only
against a particular defendant's unfair use of his mark. Due
to the fact that there is little justification for separate causes
of actions for infringement and unfair competition, the tradi-
tional justification for the requirement of fraudulent intent is
unsound. Further, since the marks serve the same function
when the nontechnical mark is accompanied by secondary
meaning, they should be provided the same protection.
Therefore, the Wisconsin court, in rejecting Wichman's ar-
gument requiring proof of fraudulent intent in actions to pro-
tect a nontechnical mark which has acquired secondary mean-
ing, acted upon firm practical and theoretical considerations.
The net effect of its action is to change the focus of analysis
from the defendant's intention to what the defendant has
done. The focus of analysis now is whether or not the proba-
ble tendency of the defendant's act or conduct is to deceive
the public as to the source of his goods.67 This is not to say
that fraudulent intent has become unimportant in actions of
this nature. Most courts still regard it as an important factor
to be considered in determining the existence of a "likelihood
of confusion. 6
C. Competition of Products of Services
The defendant in Wichman also argued that a nontechnical
mark which has acquired secondary meaning is not entitled to
protection where there is no evidence of competition between
the parties. According to this argument, since the plaintiff was
involved in providing banking services while defendant was
involved in home building, the plaintiff's mark was not enti-
63. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 86.1(a), at 1058-59.
64. Id. at 1060.
65. Handler & Pickett, supra note 14, at 769.
66. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 86.1(a) at 1055-56.
67. Id. at 1057.
68. E. KINTER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER, at 266 (1975).
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tled to protection. Historically, competition between the par-
ties was necessary in order to assert a claim for unfair compe-
tition.69 The theory behind such a requirement was that there
can be no unfair competition without a competitive relation-
ship.Y° This rationale obviously rests upon a narrow view of
the protection afforded by an action for unfair competition.
Courts, however, have taken a broader view of the law of un-
fair competition. In Villager, Inc. v. Dial Shoe Co.,7 1 the court
noted, "under the authorities, competition is not a condition
precedent to the granting of an injunction. ' 72 Furthermore,
the court held that infringement is present not only when
products are sufficiently related to create a likelihood of con-
fusion with respect to source, but also when there is a likeli-
hood that purchasers would believe that they emanate from a
single source or that they are sponsored by a single source.7 3
Thus, courts have recognized that an injunction will lie in an
infringement action where there is either a likelihood of con-
fusion as to business or as to products. 4
Various reasons may be advanced in support of adopting
this more expansive view of the action for unfair competition.
First, the more expansive view appears to provide the public
greater protection from "confusion, mistake, and deception. '75
Second, it does not tend to limit the plaintiff's protection to
markets in which he currently operates. 6 Where a plaintiff
has invested considerable resources in acquiring a reputation,
it would appear to be most unfair to allow another to profit
from the reputation and at the same time to restrict the plain-
tiff's movement into the new market. Third, under the nar-
rower view, a diversion of trade may result causing a direct
loss to the plaintiff where a defendant uses a mark which cre-
ates a likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship and where
69. Id. at 274.
70. 1 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COzMPLMION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPO-
LIES (3d ed. 1969), § 5.1, at 142.
71. 256 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
72. Id. at 702 (quoting North Am. Aircoach Sys., Inc. v. North Am. Aviation, Inc.,
231 F.2d 205, 211 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 351 U.S. 920 (1956)).
73. 256 F. Supp. at 694.
74. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 80.3, at 550-51.
75. 256 F. Supp. at 702.
76. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 80.2, at 548.
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there is an absence of direct competition. 7 For example, a
seller's reputation may extend to a geographical market in
which he has never sold goods. A defendant may cause diver-
sion of trade by selling a product in that market bearing a
mark which creates a likelihood of confusion with respect to
whether the plaintiff or defendant is the source of the prod-
uct. Since there is no direct competition, the narrow view
would deny relief to the plaintiff even though some buyers
may go to the seller's market to purchase the goods or ser-
vices. A similar problem arises with respect to movements into
new product lines. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
more expansive view will protect the plaintiff from damage to
his reputation which could result from the public attributing
to him goods or services provided by the defendant. Head to
head competition is not required to satisfy the "likelihood of
confusion" standard which is the gravamen of this type of ac-
tion. Even if it is unlikely that there may exist confusion as to
the origin of products or services, there still may arise a likeli-
hood of confusion with respect to approval or sponsorship. 8
Confusion as to sponsorship includes situations where there is
confusion as to the existence of any relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant. It has been noted that confusion
of business may arise: (1) where the defendant was thought to
be an affiliate of the plaintiff; or (2) where the defendant en-
joys a special status with the plaintiff such as that of an au-
thorized dealer; or (3) where the mark identifies the defen-
dant as a branch of the plaintiff manufacturer; or (4) where
the mark appears to be the plaintiff's endorsement of the de-
fendant's activities; or (5) where, based upon some trade cus-
tom, the public will assume a connection between the par-
ties .7  In such situations it is of no consequence that the
defendant's reputation is good.80 It is the plaintiff's reputation
and good will which are subject to the'risk of harm from the
defendant since the plaintiff's reputation is no longer of his
own making.81 The plaintiff's reputation may also be affected
in ways not directly related to potential aspersions cast upon
77. Developments, supra note 14, at 844.
78. Id.
79. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 80.2, at 545-47.
80. Developments, supra note 14, at 844.
81. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, § 80.2, at 547-48.
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it by the defendant's reputation. For example, plaintiff's cus-
tomers may be led to believe that the plaintiff, their supplier,
has placed himself in direct competition with them. 2 Perhaps,
too, his good will with his dealers may be impaired by charges
of favoritism83 or that he has sold his goods to a class of re-
tailer chain stores which constitutes a major rival to his usual
clientele.8 4 There may thus arise a number of important direct
and indirect injuries to plaintiff's reputation and good will by
a defendant's use of a mark which is confusingly similar to a
plaintiff's nontechnical mark which has acquired a secondary
meaning.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Wichman adopts a less stringent standard for
establishing actions for infringement of nontechnical marks
which have acquired a secondary meaning by equating such
actions with those brought for infringement of technical
marks. This is defensible on both theoretical and practical
grounds. Actions for protection of nontechnical marks which
have acquired secondary meaning no longer require proof of
fraudulent intent or competition. Instead, these are factors to
be considered in determining whether a likelihood of confu-
sion exists between the two marks.
It would appear that this decision shifts the focus from an
analysis of the plaintiff's rights to the nature of the defen-
dant's conduct and its effect on the plaintiff. This shift is an
apparent recognition of the artificial nature of the distinctions
heretofore justifying the separate causes of action and the re-
quirement of fraudulent intent.
PAUL E. RUMLER
82. Id. at 548-49.
83. Id. at 549.
84. Id.
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